Duverger's Law in France

Duverger’s Law in France

                According to Maurice Duverger, the effective number of parties in an electoral district is a direct result of the electoral rules for that district. Duverger argues that single-member-district party rules basically produce two parties, while proportional representation allows for many more. To test this theory, I will analyze the country of France’s electoral system. Proceeding in the most accurate way possible, I will determine the number of effective parties in France and describe the electoral rules in detail.

                According to the formula [n=∑(p^2)] where n is the number of effective parties and p is the percentage of seats that a party has in the lower chamber, the number of effective parties in France is about three (2.84). When looking at the actual data, it is clear that there are really two effective parties: the Socialist Party and the Union for a Popular Movement. The Socialist Party had over 45% of the seats in the lower chamber–the French National Assembly–while the Union for a Popular Movement had over 33% of the seats in the lower chamber (Inter-Parliamentary Union).

                Describing the rules that govern the electoral system in France is not as simple as determining the approximate number of effective parties. Still, the task of detailing the electoral system in France can be completed by identifying a few simple things: the district magnitude, the district formula, the list structure, and the presence or absence of a threshold.

First, the district magnitude of France is one, with each district being allotted one seat. Members of the National Assembly are directly voted into office for five-year terms. The formula for electing representatives is somewhat of a hybrid. Representatives are voted into office in a two-round system, and they must have a majority of the vote to take office. A candidate is elected in the first round only if he/she obtains an absolute majority of the total votes cast.

At this point in the electoral process, France uses a kind of threshold to “weed out” candidates. To be eligible for the second round, candidates must obtain a number of votes equal to at least 12.5% of the total number of registered voters. However, if only one candidate fulfills this condition, the person who polls the second largest number of votes in the first ballot may also participate in the second at which, to be elected, a simple majority suffices (Inter-Parliamentary Union). 

The list structure of France’s electoral system is open. Candidates hopeful of obtaining office merely need to place a submission of candidature four Fridays before polling day to become eligible to run. The citizens of France decide which candidates they vote for in what is termed a “preference vote.” The list of candidates is open, and the citizens know who they are voting for.

Duverger’s law seems to hold true, at least concerning the country of France. He states that countries that employ SMDP systems generally have just two effective parties, while states which opt for proportional representation have a greater number of effective parties. A SMDP system is used in France, and two effective parties have been vying for control in the state since the adoption of their current system. This data suggests that Duverger’s Law is a sound principle of political science and confirms the idea that SMDP systems lead to only two effective parties.

REFERENCES

  
Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2012. France: Assemlee Nationale. http://www.ipu.org/parline-

e/reports/2113_E.htm (accessed October 31, 2012).  

Wikipedia. 2012. Elections in France. Wikipedia.org. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_France

(accessed October 31, 2012).