Duverger’s Law states that the effective number of parties
in any electoral district is a function of the electoral rules: SMDP rules
produce two effective parties, while proportional representation rules allow
for more. In my study of Mexico, I
found this law to be true because Mexico utilizes both sets of rules in a
hybrid system that results in three effective political parties.
Mexico
has a bicameral system with two chambers that make up the Congress of the
Union. The Chamber of Deputies is
the lower chamber of the Congress and is made up of 500 members which are elected
for a three-year term of office, and may not be immediately re-elected. The
electoral system that functions is a sort of hybrid that combines elements SMDP
rules as well as PR rules. A total of 300 seats are elected in single member
districts by the first-past-the-post method; every federal entity has a minimum
of two single-member seats. The
remaining 200 members are elected by proportional representation in 5
multi-state constituencies, or electoral districts, with 40 seats each. In order to participate in the
apportionment of Chamber of Deputies proportional seats, a political party must
field candidates in at lest 200 single-member districts, and receive at least
two percent of the total number of votes cast for proportional lists, including
invalid ballots. However, no political party may receive more than 300 seats
(www.electionresources.org). This shows how the SMDP rules can be combined with
PR rules to effectively compose an electoral system.
Mexico
has a multi-party system that is made up of seven nationally recognized
political parties by the Federal Electoral Institute. However, historically
there have been three parties that have dominated the political scene: the
National Action Party which is a right of center party, the Institutional
Revolutionary Party which is a centrist party composed of right leaning and
left leaning members, and the Party of the Democratic Revolution which is a
left of center party. Using the formula we discussed in class, the number of
effective parties in Mexico was calculated to be a little bit more than three. In
the July 2012 election, the Institutional Revolutionary Party received 212
total seats, the National Action Party received 114 total seats, and the Party
of the Democratic Revolution received 104 total seats, which is a significantly
greater amount of seats than all of the other parties that received a portion
of the seats (www.ipu.org). This calculation validates the other sources that
claim that Mexico has historically been dominated by three political
parties. This calculation also
provides evidence that backs up the theory behind SMDP rules as well as PR
rules.
SMDP rules generally allow for two dominating political
parties whereas PR rules generally allow for more competition between a greater
number of parties. The fact that
Mexico has three effective parties shows how it is a hybrid because the results
for the number of effective parties lies somewhere in between the general
results of the two sets of rules. If SMDP rules were the only rules set in place we would see
two dominating parties whereas if strictly PR rules were used we would see a
large amount of effective parties.
Overall this hybrid seems to be an effective approach to elect the
members of the Chamber of Deputies.
Works Cited
http://www.electionresources.org/mx/index_en.html.
Federal Elections in Mexico.
Manuel Alvarez Rivera. November 1, 2012
http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2211_E.htm.
Inter-Parliamentary Union: Mexico. November 1.2012
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congress_of_Mexico
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Mexico
I find it interesting that Mexico, which combines SMDP and PR rules, has 3 parties that dominate. This makes sense and you do a good job of explaining it, but I found it odd that Norway, which I studied, also has three parties that receive significantly more votes that the other parties and yet has only PR rules. It's interesting to see the similarities that can result despite differences in rules.
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