Blog 8: Aceh Freedom Movement

Blake Brown
PLSC 150
Blog #8: Political Violence

Like many terms in the realm of political science, political violence has been defined and categorized in various ways. One category of political violence, civil war, is defined by David J. Samuels as, “armed combat within the boundaries of a sovereign state between parties that are subject to common authority at the start of hostilities.”1 Definitions of these different types of political violence are subject to debate and can only find strength through real-life application. The instance of political violence in Aceh, Indonesia undoubtedly supports Samuels’ definition of civil war as if fulfills all of the requirements, opportunities, and interests associated with civil war.
Indonesia is a country of ethnic diversity. One especially potent ethnicity is that of the Acehnese. These people originate from the province of Aceh, located on the northern tip of the island of Sumatra. At the expulsion of Dutch colonial rule in the mid-19th century, Aceh reluctantly joined the creation of the Indonesian state. As a result of exploitation by the Javanese majority government, and other cultural grievances, conflicts eventually led to violence by the creation of GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, “Aceh Freedom Movement”) in 19762.
According to Samuel’s definition, in order for an instance of political violence to be considered a civil war, it must satisfy two main requirements. The first requirement for civil war is “armed combat within a sovereign state.”1 More specifically, armed combat must result in at least 1,000 deaths and be sustained for at least one year1. The violence that occurred between the armed forces of GAM and the Indonesian government easily fulfills this requirement. Deaths attributed to this conflict reached 1,000 in 1990-1991 and 2000-2002. From 1998 to 2003 the conflict caused an estimated 4,300 deaths, well over the mark designated by Samuels2. The sustained amount of war surpassing the one year requirement is reflected in three incarnations of GAM (1976-1979, 1989-1991 and 1999)2.  The second qualification requires both parties to be subject to “common authority” before violence occurs1. Despite its reluctance, Aceh had in fact submitted to a central Indonesian government with its creation in the 1940’s2.  By meeting both of the requirements stated by Samuels, the Aceh instance provides strong support for his definition of civil war.
In Samuels’ book, Comparative Politics, he specifies that civil wars will often be associated with three specific opportunities, all of which had influence in the Acehnese conflict1. The first, colonial legacy, was a very evident influence for the Acehnese civil war. After the Dutch abandoned their rule in Indonesia, the former colonies attempted to band together in a single state. This was problematic considering Aceh’s strong sense of independence and its autonomous past. In the second incarnation of GAM, the second opportunity, the international context, played a crucial role. After their defeat in 1979, GAM relocated to Sweden where they solicited the help of the Libyan government. Libya provided much needed training and monetary support that fueled the civil war from 1989-19912.  Geography was the final opportunity that influenced the emergence of civil war. Aceh is a very mountainous region that provided the ability for the GAM army to conduct guerilla warfare against Indonesian forces.
Samuels’ also enumerates three interests of civil war that are supported by the Aceh conflict2. First and foremost, cultural grievances constituted a significant interest for the people of Aceh to participate in civil war. Of all the grievances held by the Acehnese people, the lack of faith in the credibility of the Central Indonesian government was by far the most influential. Throughout the years of conflict, the central government had frequently come short of promises to increase Aceh’s level of autonomy2. In combination with this grievance, pressure to join and individual psychology represented two other strong interests for the Acehnese people to engage in civil war.  Initially GAM was required to use coercive tactics to foster support. It often held family members of those who dodged joining GAM hostage and tortured many others. However, eventually a psychology of vengeance emerged with the orphaned children of those killed by the Indonesian army and by 2001 GAM held control of 80 percent of the villages of Aceh2.
The validity of Samuels’ definition of civil war is strongly supported by the example of the Aceh conflict in Indonesia.  It provides real-life evidence of all the components that structure his definition. This definition is precise and true in the fact that it provides requirements, opportunities, and interests that are common to civil war.


1. David J. Samuels, Comparative Politics (New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2013), 259-268.
2. Michael L. Ross, Understanding Civil War: Resources and Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005), 35-58, accessed November 8, 2012, http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/ResourcesRebellion.pdf.